Education: domestication or liberation?

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I am convinced that the so-called commonplace is not always just the cliché suggested in its verbal expression. The commonplace on the contrary is very often found only in the formal expression of the language, and is therefore merely apparent. When language is 'bureaucratized' into conventional formulae, it satisfies the need we sometimes experience of concealing in the cliché the importance of some theme which is awaiting its critical perception.

On other occasions there is not even the formal expression of the language—the verbal expression describing the fact becomes a commonplace from the very obviousness of the fact. Whichever the case, our principal task is to transcend the naïveté which allows itself to be deceived by appearances; we thus acquire the critical attitude which breaks through the obscurity of the commonplace or of the apparent commonplace and brings us face to face with the fact until now concealed. This is the attitude of this essay—that of seeking to apprehend the deeper meaning of facts and at the same time to strip them of their disguises.

Thus, the first apparent commonplace, on the critical analysis of which will depend the understanding of this essay, can be expressed thus: education cannot be neutral.¹

If we claim to go beyond the naïve, formal interpretations of the human task of education, this must be the starting point of a critical or dialectical reflection. Lacking this critical spirit, either because we are alienated to thinking statically and not dynamically, or because

¹. This article was written for a series of studies prepared for the International Commission on the Development of Education, at Unesco.

we already have ideological interests, we are incapable of perceiving the true role of education, or if we do perceive it, we disguise it. We tend to ignore or to obscure the role of education, which, in that it is a social 'praxis' will always be in the service either of the 'domestication' of men or of their liberation. Thus we always lose ourselves in verbalistic considerations on the subject of what is termed 'the educational crisis'; or on the subject of the need for reforms in the didactic processes; in the face of the fundamental problems of structure, with which the educational process is concerned, we indulge ourselves in these amusements.

At other moments, alarmed by the inevitable choice we have to make between education as a domesticking praxis and education as a liberating praxis, we seek a third way—which is non-existent per se. We declare education to be neutral, as if it were not a human obligation, as if men were not beings in history, as if the teleological character of the educational praxis were not the factor which determined the non-viability of its neutrality. Furthermore, all we do in affirming this neutrality is to opt for domestication which we simply proceed to disguise.

Neutral education cannot, in fact, exist. It is fundamental for us to know that, when we work on the content of the educational curriculum when we discuss methods and processes, when we plan, when we draw up educational policies, we are engaged in political acts which imply an ideological choice; whether it is obscure or clear is not important. To recognize that neutral education is not viable involves a critical form of thinking and of perceiving reality, and demands an ever-growing practice of that manner of thinking which continually revises itself, seeking always to overcome its opposite, which is the naive manner of thinking. It is this requirement, stemming from critical thinking, which imposes on us the need of taking our earlier affirmation that education is not neutral, as a problem to be 'unveiled' as a problem, and not seeing it as a set phrase or as a mere 'slogan'. It is this critical manner of thinking which always desires to go beyond the deceptive appearances, to seek the raison d'être of facts, and the relationships between different facts, within the totality of which they are a part. However, for the critical mind, the simple affirmation that 'neutral education' is not viable should not stop at the level of merely being aware of the fact. The mere awareness of the fact does not constitute a full knowledge of it. What is necessary is a penetration into

the reality of which the fact is a dimension, so that mere opinion about it can be transcended by the precise knowledge of it through the apprehension of the 'reason for its being'.

For example, at the moment in which we see the educational act as the object of our critical reflection, and not as something we are merely aware of, we perceive that this act, temporally and spatially, does not restrict itself to the limitations of the description which the naive consciousness sometimes makes of it. That is to say, it is not constituted solely by the effort which societies make for its cultural preservation. If one considers the case of the dependent societies, education is on the one hand the expression of their alienation, and on the other the instrument of a further alienation which is an obstacle to its being genuine. Thus the expression 'cultural preservation', for the critical consciousness, is vague and obscure, and conceals something which needs to be clarified. In fact, the vagueness of the expression 'cultural preservation' can be explained with exactness as the perpetuation of the values of the dominating classes who organize education and determine its aims. In that it constitutes a superstructure, systematic education functions as an instrument to maintain the infrastructure in which it is generated. Hence the non-viability of its neutrality. When education is oriented toward this preservation—and educators are not always aware of this—it is obvious that its task is to adapt new generations to the social system it serves, which can and must be reformed and modernized, but which will never be radically transformed.

It is impossible for the power-elites to organize, plan or reform education with the aim of laying open to question the essence of the social system in which precisely they are elites. Their real desire, on the contrary, must be, let us repeat, to 'recuperate' the educators, which is as much as to say, to adapt them to the system. Their ideas and values, their way of being, are announced as if they were—or should be—the ideas, values and way of being of all society, even though the popular classes cannot share them, perhaps because of their ontological inferiority.

It is without question that the concretizing of these aims requires at one and the same time the 'domesticating' character of this education and the explanation of it. As the social order is 'sacralized', systematic education must necessarily become a powerful instrument of social control.1


1. See the essays of Ivan Illich and Everett Reimers: An Essay on Alternatives in Education, Mexico, CIDOC (Cuerpo No. 1055).
The point of departure of this domesticating education (which requires the de-dialectization of thought) must be, paradoxically enough, in the very dialectization which exists between the consciousness and the world, or in other words, in the relationship between man and the world. It is curious to observe that the act of de-dialectization, of reducing thought to a state of naiveté, must have the same radical origin as the dialectizing and critical-making force of thought which is at the base of education as the praxis of liberty. None of these antagonistic forms of education or of cultural action can escape the consciousness-world dialectization, even though their practices are diametrically opposed with regard to this dialectization. Thus, education or cultural action for domestication is bound to divide the consciousness from the world, and to consider the consciousness as an empty space within man which is to be filled with contents. This separation, which results in the consciousness and the world being taken as statically opposed separate entities, implies the negation of the power of reflection of the consciousness, which is transformed into the empty space referred to. In fact, 'world and consciousness are not statically opposed to each other, they are related to each other dialectically, within their original and radical unity. For this reason the truth of one is to be gained through the other; truth is not given, it conquers itself and makes itself. It is, at once, discovery and invention'.

This is precisely what education, or cultural action for domestication cannot claim. Instead, as an ideologizing instrument it imposes the mythification of the world instead of its truth, through the truth of the consciousness which critically 'unveils' this world. Thus, the mythification of the world—the world of the consciousness—means the mythification of the consciousness: consciousness of the world.

It would then be an unpardonable contradiction on the part of the power-elites if they consented to the kind of cultural action on a large scale which considered social reality (which mediates men) as the object of their truly critical analysis.

This is because this type of cultural action implies an epistemological practice which would be the contradiction of the one which characterizes cultural action for domestication.


The epistemological practice of cultural action or education for domestication divides teaching and learning, knowing and working, thinking and doing, informing and forming, re-knowing existing knowledge and creating new knowledge. In this kind of action, knowing is receiving information, or stocking 'deposits' made by others. Hence the form of action has the characteristic—which it never loses—of being a mere act of transferring knowledge. In this act, the educator—he who knows—transfers existing knowledge to the educator: he who does not know. In this practice, knowledge is a mere given fact and not a permanent process which entails the praxis of men on the world. In this strange epistemology, there is no knowable object, but complete knowledge which the educator possesses. Thus it is incumbent on him to transfer, bring, extend, give and hand over to the 'ignorant' educatee, the 'knowledge' he possesses. In this way, the active character of the consciousness, when it is 'intentionality' towards the world, becomes passive; it is this active character which on the one hand explains man's ability for 're-knowing' existing knowledge, and on the other his ability for creating new knowledge. This practice of 'anaesthetizing' of de-dialectizing thought can also be seen in the emphasis laid on the 'focalist' rather than the totalizing perception of reality. This twisted view of the facts, which is not only unable to apprehend the relationships existing between them, but not even the relationships existing between the parts which constitute the totality of each of them either, is profoundly alienating. This way of seeking knowledge, which implies a conception of an immutable reality, can only lead us to a distorted view of things, which thus 'empty themselves' of their unquestionable temporality. Thus, we never get beyond the superficiality of the phenomena which we do not manage to understand in all their complexity and dynamism.

This way of acting is both alienating and 'domesticating', no matter whether the educators are or are not conscious of this.

It is not difficult to come on the practice of 'domestication' which we are analysing in systematic education, whatever its level. In the primary and secondary schools, in the university (and also in adult education campaigns) we are witness to the transfer of knowledge, and not the search for knowledge, to knowledge as a given fact possessed by the educator, and not knowledge as a process, to knowledge as something without conditions, taken as chaste and universal, to the
split between teaching and learning, to the understanding of reality as something immobile, where reality is seen as a given fact and not as a process or a state of ‘becoming’ in order to be able to ‘be’.

We could add to all this the myth that science is neutral, that the scientist is impartial, the myth of what must necessarily come out of his lack of preoccupation with the aims laid on the results of his activity as a scientist.

Let us see, in more concrete terms, although not extensively, how, and in what areas, education figures as the practice of ‘domestication’. First of all, since the school is an instrument of social control, it cannot be a theoretical context, dialectically related to a concrete or objective context in which facts occur. Instead of permanently seeking the reason for the existence of the objective facts, in order to theorize them, the school becomes an agency specialized in the formal enunciation of them. Its false point of departure implies the epistemological distortion we have already spoken of, in which to know is reduced to a mechanical dualism expressed in the transference-reception of given facts.

Thus the relations between educator and educand are the relations of a subject to an object, which means that the latter is the mere recipient of the contents of the knowledge of the former. The educator, he who knows, he who separates the act of teaching from the act of learning, is therefore always the educator of the educand, while the latter is always the educand of the educator. This explains the antidiagnostic character of this form of education. This situation of antidiagoue is not only present in the epistemological relationship already referred to, but is also present in the disciplinary relationship. The educator is the one who thinks, who says his word, who knows; the educand has the illusion that he is thinking, through the thinking of the educator; he has the illusion that he is saying his word, in repeating what the educator says; he has the illusion that he knows, because the educator knows. Inasmuch as the school cannot be a genuinely theoretical context; inasmuch as the educator is the transmitter of a knowledge which merely describes reality as a given fact; inasmuch as the educator declares that he knows what ought to be taught, and does not recognize that he learns as he teaches, it seems obvious to him that it is incumbent on him to choose the content of the educational curriculum. The educand can do nothing but let him-

self doxically be filled with this content. ‘Because of this, in general, the good educand is neither restive, nor indolent; he does not show doubt, he does not wish to know the reason for facts, he does not go beyond set models, he does not denounce “mediocrizing” bureaucracy, he does not refuse to be an object. The good educand, in this type of education, on the contrary, is he who repeats, who refuses to think critically, who adapts to models, who finds it nice to be a rhinoceros.’ (See Ionesco: Rhinoceros.)

Before all this force of domestication, stands one really important question: Why is it possible for man, in spite of everything, to emerge critically, denouncing the ways of domestication? The answer to this basic question sends us back again to the problem of the consciousness, of its reflective character (and not only its reflective character), of its intentionality.

If all this attempt at alienating, at de-dialectizing thought ‘domesticates’ the capacity of the consciousness for reflection and criticism, or of man to be a conscious being, it cannot however make this capacity disappear. Sooner or later, the power of reflection and criticism reconstitutes itself in the very process of its ‘domestication’. This is why we are able to talk about the liberation of man, even when we have to say that this does not stem from the mere recognition that it is necessary, but rather from the praxis which transforms the world in which we are free. Contrary to education for domestication, education for liberation is an eminently Utopian praxis. This does not mean that it cannot be carried out. The Utopian nature of this type of education is expressed in the permanent state of unity which exists between the acts of denouncing and announcing, which give it life. In fact, domesticating education, which satisfies the interests of the dominating élites and corresponds to their ideology, can never be Utopian in the sense discussed here.

What denunciation can those who dominate make, unless it is the denunciation of those who denounce them? What can they announce except their own myths? What does their future as dominators consist of but the preservation of their present as privileged beings? Only education for liberation can be Utopian, and because it is Utopian, prophetic and hopeful. I cannot be prophetic or hopeful if my future is to be the repetition of a ‘well-conducted’ present, or of this present simply ‘reformed’ in some of its secondary aspects. Only those who

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1. Again I suggest the reading of the essays of Ivan Ilich, op. cit.: the best expression of denunciation today of the myth of schooling.
are dominated can truly denounce and announce—denounce the world in which they exist but are forbidden to be, and announce the world in which they are able to be, and which demands their historical commitment in order for it to be brought into being. It is only they who have a future different from the present, an aspiration to be created and re-created. In their present as dominated beings can be found the plan of their liberation, which can be identified with the future which they must build.¹

Contrary to education for domestication, education for liberation, Utopian, prophetic and hopeful, is an art of knowing and a means of action for transforming the reality which is to be known.

The epistemological focus of attention changes radically from one to another of the opposing forms of education or cultural action.

While in education for domestication one cannot speak of a knowable object but only of knowledge which is complete, which the educator possesses and transfers to the educatee, in education for liberation there is no complete knowledge possessed by the educator, but a knowable object which mediates educator and educatee as subjects in the knowing process. Dialogue is established as the seal of the epistemological relationship between subjects in the knowing process. There is not an 'I think' which transfers its thought, but rather a 'we think' which makes possible the existence of an 'I think'. The educator is not he who knows, but he who knows how little he knows, and because of this seeks to know more, together with the educatee, who in turn knows that starting from his little knowledge he can come to know more. Here there is no split between knowing and doing; there is no room for the separate existence of a world of those who know, and world for those who work.

While in the domesticating practice the educator is always the educator of the educatee, in the liberating practice the educator must 'die' as exclusive educator of the educatee in order to be 'born' again as educatee of the educatee. At the same time, he must propose to the educates that he 'die' as exclusive educatee of the educator in order to be 'born' again as educator of the educator.² This is a continual passage back and forth, a humble, creative movement, which both have to make. Because educator—educatee accept in communion with each other the role of subjects in the educational act which is a permanent process, the educator no longer has the right to establish the curriculum-content of education, which does not belong exclusively to him. The organization of the curriculum, which must be regarded as a 'knowable object' by both educator—educatee and educatee—educator, requires the investigation of what we usually term the 'thematic universe'³ of the educates. Taken as the point of departure of the process, the investigation of the 'thematic universe' not only reveals to us the preoccupations of the educatee, but also their state of perception of their world.

When the curriculum whose structure is based on the themes investigated, becomes for the educates a series of problems to be 'unveiled' as such, education for liberation takes the form of the permanent unity existing between the investigation of the thematic and its presentation as a problem. If, in the moment of our investigation—which is already cultural action—we come on the themes and the levels of perception of reality, in the moment when the problematization of these themes is presented as a knowable object, the perception of reality undergoes a change, and a new set of themes emerges, through a new vision of old themes or through a perception of themes hitherto not perceived.

Thus, education (or cultural action for liberation, which it cannot fail to be) reproduces the dynamism which characterizes the historical-social process. Its mobility depends on the mobility of the facts which must genuinely be known in the practice of education. It is only through an education which does not separate action from reflection, theory from practice, consciousness from the world, that it is possible to develop a dialectic form of thinking which contributes to the insertion of men as subjects in their historical reality.

In that it is Utopian and demythologizing, education or cultural action for liberation implies a constant risk which we do not always want to run, since we are tempted by the stability we fear to lose. In the long run, in preferring stability, immobility, self-censure, conspiratorial silence, all we do is renounce liberty because we are afraid of it. We shall thus not be able critically to have 'unusual ideas about education', since thinking in this way is to be committed, and requires of us a greater risk: that of putting into practice some of the unusual ideas.⁴

¹. For this theme, see Paulo Freire, Cultural Action for Freedom, op. cit.
³. In Pedagogy of the Oppressed, I give a whole chapter to this question. In addition, at Unesco Consultative in the Instituto de Capacitación e Investigación en Reforma Agraria, ICIRA, Santiago, Chile, I co-ordinated a team to carry out an investigation of this type in one of the rural areas of Chile. The final report was recently published under the title: Investigación de la Tendencia Cultural de los Comuniones de El Revenir, ed. by Maris Edy Ferreira and José Luis Fetti.
⁴. Request for permission to reproduce this article should be addressed to the Editor of Prospect.